Lt. Gen Prakash Katoch
In 2000, Chinese officials told a visiting delegation from India's National Defence College that China will integrate Taiwan with the mainland by 2025. The plan obviously included the Wuhan Virus and speedy development of new concept weapons to incapacitate the adversaries. Chinese threats to Taiwan are increasing, as is frequency of its air intrusions in Taiwan's airspace. Admiral Philip S Davidson, former Commander US INDOPACOM says China could invade Taiwan in next six years. But none can predict China's calculus and when it perceives the right opportunity.
Articles describe how the US-China war over Taiwan could play out; mostly at sea with possibility of US troop deployments in Taiwan ambiguous, and China making aiming to make America incapable of defending the island. But US targeting mainland China would need to take into consideration counter strikes on US mainland. One view is that Beijing could use military power to control access to Taiwan by air and sea, declare sovereign control over Taiwan and let it function under ‘One Country, Two Systems', eventually subsuming it like Hong Kong. China has authorized its Coast Guard to board and inspect foreign vessels in waters claimed by Beijing.
In June 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping said China is committed to peace (sic) but will not give up even one inch of territory – which obviously includes all illegal claims. Taiwan remains China's top priority. For the 100th anniversary of founding of the CCP in July 2021, Jinping has demonstrated China's strength by biologically bombing the world. He perceives himself as China's ruler for life but indications are that some within the CCP don't appreciate his actions of taking on the world and overambitious Belt and Road Initiative.
Jinping's conflict time-table would depend on how strong his hold remains at home leading up to the CCP's 20th Congress in October 2022, state of China's economy and degree of Beijing's influence worldwide, global turbulence and America's military commitments – latest being militarization of Arctic and US-NATO plan to boost deployments in the region. Also, Capitol Hill has realized how its Russian policy has led to closer China-Russia embrace. However, rapprochement with Russia after years of hostility will not be easy going from the far from cordial meeting between US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on May 19 in Reykjavik, Capital of Iceland.
On the Indian front, PLA is conducting exercises in depth areas facing the LAC in Eastern Ladakh. These exercises are taking place after China finished rotating its troops in Eastern Ladakhincluding the two motorized divisions inducted last year. This confirms China will disengage any more. China has converted its troop shelters, ammunition depots, helipads, surface-to-air missile positions post the 2020 aggression into permanent positions. PLA has also deployed long range multiple rocket launcher system (MLRS) opposite the LAC with strike ranges from 130 km to 220 km and has extended its map grids into India enabling acquisition of targets deeper in our territory.
Jayadeva Ranade, President, Centre for China Analysis and Strategy and former Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat opines that China's military preparations show that China will not only maintain pressure on India over the longer term, but that the “PLA might undertake operations this summer to achieve whatever objectives they could not achieve before arriving on our borders last May.” General MM Naravane, Chief of the Army Staff, said on May 19 that the Army has adequate number of troops deployed in Eastern Ladakh to tackle any contingency, expressing hope that military confrontation with China would be resolved through dialogue. Media has also quoted a government source saying that with the onset of summer, the Indian Army and the IAF have also strengthened their military posture during the campaigning season all along the LAC to ensure a military surge is possible if the balloon goes up.
Dialogue with China implies gaming Chinese policy of ‘Biang Biang Noodles' mentioned by a Chinese participant in a seminar in Delhi few years back. It simply means Beijing making you run around the mulberry bush in concentric circles endlessly. But there is merit in examining why China may undertake operations this summer. With melting snows, China may like to cash on India's predicament with the pandemic spreading in rural areas.
Daulet Beg Oldi (DBO) is a strategic objective of China for well known reasons as also capturing entire Pangong Lake. China activated DepsangPlains at a later date but perhaps was discouraged from progressing operations further having been surprised by the violent clash in Galwan. China possibly also planned to occupy Kailash Range in subsequent phase but was pre-empted by India. PLA could have easily spared a brigade from the two new divisions inducted in Ladakh to occupy Kailash Range.
If China is to progress operations this summer, it can rig up any excuse – even quid pro quo to India's aggression which is its accusation from day one. China can create situations to test whether India would attack the PLA. Such actions could be: surreptitious occupation of Karakoram (KK) Pass and Kailash Range; advance in the large no-patrol zone in Depsang Plains forced since last year's aggression and firm in without attacking Indian positions, and; advance west of Finger 8 on North Bank of Pangong Lake and occupy positions short of the Indian position. A metal road already exists up to Finger 4.
Any or all of these actions are possible if China wants to test our political (not military) resolve to attack the PLA in today's setting. China would have observed that the violent Indian reaction at Galwan was at local level because had the orders come from Delhi, Indian Army would not have rested before at least occupying Galwan Heights.
If China undertakes above actions and we attack the PLA, China could then use this excuse to further operations in Depsang and Pangong Tsoemploying full range of its new concept weaponsin a bid to break through Indian defences and offsetting the disadvantage of low quality PLA manpower. This should anyway be expected in the mid and long term in Ladakh together with similar actions in Arunachal Pradesh and elsewhere considering the already completed Chinese border infrastructure and more speedy developments
Inevitable questions would include – what is the logic, why should China do the above, what will China gain by doing so, so forth and so on? But the counter questions are – does China go by logic, what has China lost despite its aggression last year and will this not further China's strategic aims, for example, occupation of KK Pass will facilitate capture of DBO and mellow our euphoria over the Chewang Rinchen Bridge in Ladakh.
Media quotes government sources about China's 2020 aggression saying that Chinese troop movements were being monitored, it was known they could occupy these positions in 24-36 hours but it was never appreciated they will actually do so. This is lame-duck excuse; it is the capability of the enemy, not the intentions that can change anytime. China has the military power and the will to use it in the manner it wants, especially against India. Finally, when China has backtracked on further disengagement, what is stopping us from re-occupying Kailash Range and occupying KK Pass, both in our territory?
