Lt. Gen Prakash Katoch (Rtd.)
It is on record that when several thousand PLA entered Lhasa in 1950-51, followed by
another 20,000 to ravage and Tibet, India supplied rice to them. According to Claude Arpi,
when China requested food from India for the PLA in Tibet since transportation from
mainland China was difficult, India was already undergoing very serious problems of food
grain supply and Nehru's government was importing food grains. China, therefore, agreed to supply food grain to India provided India supplied rice to the PLA in Tibet, which amounted to ‘feeding' the enemy. This article, however, is about a different feed – intelligence.
Intelligence has been at premium in India. In his book ‘Open Secrets – India's Intelligence
Unveiled', MK Dhar, former Joint Director Intelligence Bureau, says irrespective of which
government is in power in India, the entire intelligence effort is focused on downing the
opposition. The continued primacy given towards winning elections more than proves it.
How do we task intelligence agencies in absence of a national security strategy? According to a source at the heart of issue, the missive generally to intelligence agencies is: “udhar zara dekh lena”. Also, if the type of psychological warfare effort by IT cells of our political parties on social media was directed towards the country's adversaries, we could have been better of security-wise.
Consider following: years back we first became aware of 11,000 PLA troops in POK from a
report in New York Times; telephonic conversation between Pakistani Army Chief
Musharraf in Beijing and the CGS in Islamabad revealed Kargil intrusions were made by
Pakistani troops, not jihadis as Pakistan claimed but foreign source supplying the intercept
dried up after we went public, and; China's aggression in Ladakh during 2020 surprised us
completely despite China having constructed a new road four kilometers short of Galwan and PLA exercising on life-sized land-model of Ladakh inside Tibet over past years.
In sharp contrast we have no compunctions about airing intelligence inputs publicly by
media. But blaming media alone would not be correct when even classified documents are
deliberately leaked by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and even by the Prime Minister's
Office (PMO) to publications and TV channels in pursuit of narrow goals, earning brownie
points, obfuscating facts to cover up faults or divert attention, or putting down an individual, an organization, a political party or whatever.
Exercises of Strike Corps gave opportunity to media for drawing arrows across the border
and show pincers racing into enemy territory to areas they would supposedly reach in
operations. After Pakistan-supported terrorists attacked our Parliament on December 13,
2001, some publications gave out complete layout of the Parliament including which minister sits in which room. This type of action indicates that foreign funds are flowing into Indian media. Hopefully, floor plans of the new parliament building coming up under the Central Vista Project are not on sale.
During the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008, the media again acted irresponsible giving details when the NSG contingent would take off from Delhi and how much time it would take to reach Mumbai. But if that was not enough, minute to minute live coverage was given how security forces were moving around buildings where terrorists held hostages, where helicopters were landing troops, where snipers were positioned and where the teams would enter. This was a boon to Pakistan-based handlers who were throughout in communication with the terrorists. Earning TRPs was the sole criteria. Is such foolish media coverage allowed in operations undertaken by Britain's Special Air Services (SAS) or USSpecial Forces?
The Chinese aggression last May-June witnessed media in action again. Every detail of the
mobilization by the Army and Air Force was made public; one journalist even standing on
the road and counting how many army trucks had gone by. One scribe wrote he recently
visited GalwanValley (government sponsored trip?) saying it is too narrow to have any
deployment. TV channels established operations rooms with maps and models with anchors
brandishing pointers to discuss how the war ‘should' be fought and what were India's
‘options'.
The media blitz covering disengagement from North Bank of Pangong Lake was understandable because government wanted to portray how big this achievement was though it obfuscated the fact that we lost the strategic advantage by vacating the Kailash Range and were getting stuck with a 10-km no-patrol zone on the North Bank of Pangong Lake itself.
No media was permitted to visit Depsang, Gogra and Hot Springs for understandable reasons, especially after it became clear that the Chinese are not going to budge anymore.
Now the manner in which details of army's redeployment and movement of reserves catering for the summer campaigning season being put out in media is obnoxious, appalling which should be disturbing to our countrymen. The Army is highly conscious of security of its mobilization and deployments. So, these details are obviously being fed to the media by the politico-bureaucratic clique, some of whom may be on the payroll of Beijing. Recall the minister who personally briefed a journo how to engineer the fake story in his newspaper about a purported army coup some years back?
Media is making public key changes made by the Army, saying a key Strike Corps has been
dual-tasked, its armoured division made Army Headquarters reserve and another division
pooled from elsewhere with focus on mountain warfare attached to the Strike Corps. Also
that the 17 Mountain Strike Corps (MSC) has been given a second division by attaching one
from the east and that the MSC will be used for both northern and eastern borders. Also, after the Galwan clash, a Rashtriya Rifles (RR) sector was moved to the Galwan Valley area while units under Uniform Force from J&K were also brought in.
Media describes beefing up of troops on border as ‘punitive deterrence' a new terminology?
The ‘punitive' part perhaps is deduced from ‘deterrence by punishment' which is contingent
upon political will albeit that appears somewhat wobbly when it comes to conflict against
China perhaps for economic and other reasons; witness tweet from Delhi Chief Minister
specially thanking Indian Embassy in Beijing for helping control the second pandemic wave.
Another journalist has given details of changes in army deployment along the border with
China in a lengthy interview on camera, circulating on social media. The details have
obviously been fed to him though he keeps stating “now army says” perhaps to divert
attention unless the Chinese gave him a cape that makes him invisible, enabling him to sneak into briefings at the Military Operations Directorate.
The details he gives out include: reserve division of Northern Command rushed to Eastern
Ladakh and what is the boundary between these two divisions in Eastern Ladakh now; number of reserve brigades that will always be in western sector in acclimatized state;
location of existing brigades in Central Sector, their placement under Central Command and
one division from the Mathura-based Strike Corps assigned to Central Sector, and; similar
details about readjustment and allotment of reserves in Arunachal Pradesh including the
MSC.
Does any other country resort to this type of media coverage about own military deployments– does Pakistan or China? Do we know what is the PLA deployment in POK and Pakistan, reporting on which would really be good journalism. How can we be so naïve and
lackadaisical about operational security and who in the policy makers is responsible for it?
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting will claim ‘freedom of media' but block out what
is politically not convenient. MoDshould be concerned but is it? If the ‘deep state' wants to
show how prepared we are to impress public at home, nothing can be more depressing and
unpatriotic.
