Hiranmay Karlekar
Will a bitterly divided Taliban be able to deliver an orderly
Government, especially in the wake of the factional feuds intensifying
since Aug-Sept?
Will the Taliban be able to provide stability and peace to
Afghanistan? The deep fault lines within, that are now apparent,
warrant the question. Time was when the Ameer-ul-Momineen (Commander
of the Faithful) Mullah Mohammad Omar’s word was law for the Taliban.
Nevertheless, there were factions within the Islamist militia, which
emerged in 2015 when it came to be known that Mullah Omar had died on
April 13, 2013, but the fact was kept a secret and Mullah Akhtar
Mansour was running the organisation in his name. Mansour, who became
the successor in July 2015, was killed by a US drone strike on May 21,
2016, following which Sheikh Haibatullah Akhaundzada became
Ameer-ul-Momineen.
The continuing factional tussles intensified sharply during the
exercise in Government formation that followed the Taliban’s takeover
of Afghanistan, with capital Kabul falling to it on August 15, 2021.
The first indication of this was the fact that Zabiullah Mujahid,
Taliban’s chief spokesman, announced a caretaker Government with 33
Ministers as late as September 7, 2021. The need to reconcile
conflicting claims for shares of ministerial berths clearly made for
the delay, which was over three weeks. The argument that the Taliban
were not ready with a list of ministerial nominees because they could
not anticipate their lightning victory, will not wash. Their peace
treaty with the US, signed on February 29, 2021, which came in the
midst of their violently extending their sway over progressively wider
chunks of Afghan territory, was widely regarded as paving the way,
wittingly or unwittingly, for their not-so-distant accession to power
in Afghanistan. This and the fact that they themselves were confident
about victory, should certainly have prompted them to have the
blueprint for a Government and a list of potential Ministers ready —
particularly when Pakistan was regularly providing them with guidance.
It is now clear that the Taliban had neither such a list nor a
blueprint for governance ready. Hence the factional struggle in which
the main contenders were the faction identified with Mullah Abdul
Ghani Baradar, dominant in Kandahar, and the one headed by the Haqqani
family active in the Paktia, Paktika and Khost provinces in eastern
Afghanistan close the Pakistan, as well as northwestern Pakistan.
Media reportage as well as the train of events are revealing. Tolo
News, a 24-hours-seven-days-a-week Afghan news channel, reported on
September 3, 2021, that Taliban co-founder Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar
(who headed the Islamist militia’s political office in Doha) would
lead the Government-to-be in Afghanistan. It also said that Mullah
Mohammad Yaqoob, Taliban co-founder Mullah Mohammad Omar’s son, and
Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai would hold senior positions in the
Government.
As it turned out, it was not Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar but Mullah
Mohammad Hassan Akhund who was to head the “caretaker” Government
announced by the Taliban on September 7, 2021. Mullah Baradar was
named his deputy along with Moulavi Abdul Salam Hanafi, a prominent
Uzbek member of the negotiating team. Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob got the
Defence portfolio. Stanekzai was marginalised and made Deputy Foreign
Minister, with Amir Khan Muttaqi, a negotiator at the Afghan-American
Doha peace talks, as Foreign Minister.
Sirajuddin Haqqani, son of Jalaluddin Haqqani, the founder of the
Haqqani network, got the key Interior Ministry while Mullah
Hidayatullah Badri received Finance, and Sheikh Moulavi Noorullah
Munir and Mullah Khairullah Khairkhwa, Education and Information and
Broadcasting respectively. All of them had “acting” pre-fixed to their
designations as it was a caretaker Government. Sheikh Haibatullah
Akhaund-zada, it was said, would remain the supreme leader, the
ultimate authority over the group’s political, religious and military
affairs, that he has held since 2016.
The expansion announced on October 19, which increased the Cabinet’s
strength to 50, further reflected a balancing act between the Baradar
and Haqqani factions, with the possibility that the appointment of
Mullah Mohammad Ibrahim as Deputy Minister for Internal Security was a
placatory gesture to the Baradar faction, to which he belongs, as
Sirajuddin Haqqani has been made Interior Minister.
There have been, of course, more visible signs of factional conflict.
Mullah Baradar was reportedly hurt on September 3, 2021, when his
supporters clashed with those of the Haqqanis in Kabul and
Khalil-ul-Rahman Haqqani reportedly punched him. Baradar disappeared
after the incident, triggering speculation that he had died in the
clash, but issued a statement on September 13 dispelling the
conjecture. He returned to Kabul in early October but the report that
he has refused to accept official security, and has brought his own
security staff from Kandahar, shows the depth of mistrust and
antipathy that continues between his and the Haqqani factions.
The mistrust and antipathy are going to increase as the Baradar
faction wants the Afghan Government to be inclusive and adopt a
moderate stance on issues like human rights, particularly in respect
of women, while the Haqqani faction retains a hard-line approach.
Mutual accusations will fly if the economy remains prostrate. There
will also be violent challenges from terrorist outfits like the
Islamic State of Khorasan Province. The Taliban have a bumpy road
ahead.
