Lt Gen ASHOK JOSHI (retd), Colonel ANIL A ATHALE (retd)
Pakistan would want to take full advantage of the situation to direct Taliban trained terrorists into the Kashmir Valley, alert Lieutenant General Ashok Joshi (retd) and Colonel Anil A Athale (retd).
In the mid 1980s, the US decided to leave no stone unturned, and opted to use all the means at its disposal to oust the Soviets from Afghanistan.
General Zia-ul Haq of Pakistan became more than a willing partner in this enterprise.
If the Islamic Republic of Pakistan could help their good old friends — and not masters — to throw out the godless Soviets, Pakistan would benefit here and now, and a meritorious deed would also have been done to take care of the afterlife.
The CIA stepped in with enthusiasm with their technology, expertise and information.
Further, they would participate in training and equipping the would be mujahids.
‘Through us, please,’ was a request by Zia. Let the CIA train Pakistan army personnel who would learn quickly,and then pass on the skills and equipment to the mujahideen.
How could the CIA ignore such a constructive suggestion? Afghans in large numbers were turned into effective mujahids. Skills with weapons and explosives came naturally to them.
Pakistan was happy because it could select, train, and equip the ‘freedom fighters’ whom they sent into the Kashmir Valley.
The CIA looked away. There was a little matter of Pakistan developing a nuclear bomb; this time around, the US administration decided to look away.
The mutual support and cooperation between the US and Pakistan peaked, and Pakistajn became a frontline State for which the US could not do enough.
Apart from mujahids, the Pakistan army also decided to train young Pathans who were religious students, or ‘talibs’ to be soldiers and terrorists.
They soon emerged as full-fledged jihadists. Lieutenant General Hamid Gul of the Pakistan Army, who headed the ISI, was their godfather. He supported them even as he pursued other Islamic agenda.
Everything turned out as planned by Pakistan.
In this atmosphere, after the Soviets had been forced out, Afghanistan attracted committed jihadists from Islamic countries, stretching from Egypt to Saudi Arabia.
Most of them wanted to establish the rule of ‘sharia’ law worldwide. Violence was their selected means, and terrorism was their doctrine.
They looked up to Pakistan for sustenance, guidance, and inspiration.
It is obvious that the CIA or other Western intelligence agencies did not take them seriously at the time.
It was in this atmosphere that al-Qaeda thrived in southern Afghanistan, and led and directed the terrorists who struck the US World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001.
The US took more than 3,000 casualties. It was at that stage that the US declared war on terror.
Pakistan was tersely told by then Us deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage that either it was with the US, or against it.
There was no room to maneuver. The US had become suspicious of Pakistan.
Therefore, General Pervez Musharraf did a U-turn on a dime, and ‘joined’ the US in its war on terror, or said so, anyway.
Very skillfully, before the US carpet bombing started, Pakistan airlifted its personnel out of Afghanistan to Pakistan.
This was permitted because the US had to use the land route in Pakistan from the port city of Karachi to the Pak-Afghan border to transport tanks and other heavy equipment.
Eventually, the US inducted close to 98,000 troops into Afghanistan. Other NATO nations also contributed troops, basically as an indication of solidarity.
These best equipped and motivated troops did their best, but they too could not establish the rule of law in Afghanistan.
Insurgency on a massive scale continued. The US took more than 2,000 casualties, the last of them as recently as August 26, 2021.
During all this time, Pakistan expertise in double dealing came in handy.
Pakistan helped the US to capture some terrorists who were involved in 9/11. This well calculated move helped Pakistan to re-established its credentials with the US.
Pakistan’s entire attitude and effort can best be represented by its success in hiding and protecting Osama bin Laden until Operation Geronimo in May 2011.
An elected and representative government in Afghanistan just does not meet the Pakistan requirement.
Pakistan looks upon Afghanistan as its backyard which it can enter any time its wants.
Rather than a friendly Afghanistan, Pakistan would preferably have a compliant client State.
This alone can explain how Pakistan expects Afghanistan to yield ‘strategic depth’ to it in the event of war with India.
A representative government in Afghanistan is more likely to promote and protect its own interests rather than those of Pakistan’s.
The Taliban was created to subserve Pakistan vision and interests even as it spread Islamist terrorism.
Pakistan has largely achieved in Afghanistan what it has wanted to — that is Islamisation.
