Iran's participation is big challenge to Pentagon's military strategy
By Girish Linganna
Deterrence is straightforward! It means stopping the enemy from taking action by threatening military force. The US, with its powerful global military, should easily be able to deter Iran, which has outdated military equipment, including warships and fighter jets older than the first Moon landing.
However, in reality, it has been very tough to deter Iran. Air strikes do not work well against rebel groups and militias because their main goals are to keep fighting and staying alive, not letting things run smoothly. These groups are also prepared to sustain casualties, making them tough to intimidate. A full-scale invasion may be the only surefire method to deter them, but history shows such actions often come with serious consequences.
Since October 7, Iran's proxy militias in Syria and Iraq have launched over 160 attacks on American forces. While some of these attacks were more for show than actual harm, the attack on January 28, which killed three American soldiers at a northeastern Jordan base, was deadly. Meanwhile, the Houthis, a militia in Yemen supported by Iran, have been conducting missile and drone attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea for months. These attacks are choking off a crucial waterway that handles around 30 per cent of the world's container trade.
America has started to retaliate. On February 3, 2024, it struck over 85 targets in Iraq and Syria, marking the beginning of what US President Joe Biden described as a phased response to the Jordan drone attack. The US targeted the Houthis again the following day and on February 5. On February 7, a US strike in Baghdad took out a leader of Kataib Hezbollah, a militia in Iraq backed by Iran. Despite these actions, the attacks from Iran's proxy groups persist.
Biden's more aggressive critics believe the issue is that American threats do not carry weight because the US is hesitant in directly striking Iran. Critics (read Right-wing critics) refer to ‘Operation Praying Mantis' from the 1980s' ‘tanker wars', when the US sank five Iranian warships and demolished two oil platforms in the Persian Gulf.
The ‘tanker wars' was a phase in the 1980s' Iran-Iraq War when both countries attacked each other's oil tankers and merchant ships in the Persian Gulf. ‘Operation Praying Mantis' was a significant US military action during the ‘tanker wars'. Critics use this historical example to argue that credible and direct action may be necessary to effectively deter Iran today.
Left-wing critics have a different perspective. They view discussions about deterrence as unnecessary aggression and propose what they believe is an uncomplicated solution: end the Gaza conflict. They argue that, if Israel ceases its military actions against Palestinians, the violent responses from Iranian-backed militias may also come to a halt.
Both arguments are missing something important. True, when the US attacked Iran's navy in 1988, the latter was compelled to reduce its attacks on oil tankers and stopped attacking Americans completely. But Iran in those days was drained from an eight-year devastating war with Saddam Hussein's Iraq and lacked strong allies. This left it with no option, but to back down. Today's Iran has a strong network of proxy groups and receives some support from both Russia and China. A series of American strikes could potentially push Iran to rely more heavily on its proxy groups and may even prompt it to accelerate its quest for a nuclear weapon as a safeguard against future attacks.
Many of Iran's proxies use Gaza as a reason for their actions. However, the history of violence did not begin on October 7. Over the past decade, militias in Syria and Iraq have launched numerous attacks on American forces. The Houthis also have a history of attacking ships; the war simply provides them with a reason to intensify activities they were already engaged in.
America's difficulty in deterring Iran arises from fundamental inconsistencies in its Middle East policy. Specifically, the US wants to reduce its focus on the region, but continues to maintain troops there. This leaves a military presence large enough to be a target, but too small to effectively limit Iran's actions. This risky setup had lethal outcomes on January 28. A drone strike targeted Tower 22 in Jordan, a logistical centre that supports al-Tanf, a distant US military base in Syria. The attack highlights the vulnerability of American positions that are large enough to be noticed, but not strong enough to deter aggressors.
Iran might be discouraged from deploying its proxies if it believed the US was ready to overthrow its government. However, after 20 years of unsuccessful American interventions in the Middle East, neither Americans, nor Iranians think this is likely to happen.
America's regional allies are also skeptical. A decade ago, Israel and several Gulf nations may have supported US strikes on Iranian proxies. Back then, the region was in turmoil: Iran was aiding Bashar al-Assad in transforming Syria into a zone of massive casualties, while the Houthis were advancing from their northern strongholds to take over most of Yemen's major population areas. A prolonged series of American airstrikes could have potentially altered the outcomes of the civil wars in both Syria and Yemen.
Today, however, those conflicts have largely stabilized, with outcomes that favour Iran's allies. The regime has established strong influences in four Arab countries and a few sporadic airstrikes will not be enough to remove it. This is why Saudi Arabia and the UAE have sought to mend ties with Iran: if the US cannot effectively safeguard its allies, they believe pursuing peace through diplomatic talks and economic incentives offers a more secure option.
Following the strikes in Syria and Iraq, American officials have spoken not about deterrence, but about efforts to ‘reduce' the strength of Iranian-backed groups. This may be more practical: if America destroys enough Houthi anti-ship missiles, they will have to halt their attacks, at least temporarily. However, this would need a sustained campaign, something Biden might prefer to avoid, which brings us back to the central issue. In the Middle East, America is caught between wanting to leave and needing to stay, unsure of how to handle its remaining forces in the region.
(IPA Service)
