Pakistan Govt has not yet dismantled the Jihadi Infra within the country
By Aritra Banerjee
On the evening of November 26, 2008, India’s financial capital, Mumbai, was transformed into a war zone. Ten heavily armed terrorists stormed the city in a series of coordinated assaults that lasted nearly three days, killing 166 people and injuring hundreds more.
They struck at iconic locations — the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, Leopold Café, and Nariman House — leaving a trail of horror that stunned the world. But 26/11 was not merely a terrorist incident. It was the culmination of Pakistan’s state-nurtured jihadist ecosystem, directed and sustained by its military-intelligence establishment.
The attacks bore the unmistakable imprint of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a proxy organisation created, trained, and protected by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the same entity that had long orchestrated violence across India, from the 1993 Mumbai blasts to the 2016 Uri attack and the 2019 Pulwama suicide bombing.
Investigations in India, the United States, and Europe confirmed that the ten attackers were Pakistani nationals trained at LeT camps in Muridke near Lahore and Thatta in Sindh province. The operation was conceived by LeT’s top command, led by Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, under the ideological guidance of Hafiz Saeed, the group’s chief and a long-time ISI asset.
Their training was exhaustive, covering weapons handling, marine navigation, GPS-based reconnaissance, and urban combat. The recruits were radicalised in madrassas run by LeT’s front organisation, Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), which continues to operate openly in Pakistan under the protection of the state.
The attack was launched from Karachi’s coastline, using a Pakistani trawler that hijacked the Indian vessel Kuber mid-sea. After murdering its crew, the terrorists sailed undetected into Mumbai’s harbour.
They were guided in real time by handlers in Pakistan through Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) communications and satellite phones, receiving tactical instructions as the carnage unfolded. Intercepts and forensic evidence later confirmed the presence of Pakistani military accents and technical expertise on these calls, indicating ISI’s direct role.
Initially, Pakistan denied any involvement, claiming the attackers were non-state actors. But as global intelligence cooperation mounted, Islamabad was forced to admit that Ajmal Kasab, the only surviving gunman, was indeed a Pakistani citizen.
By July 2009, even Pakistani officials conceded that LeT had “plotted and financed” the attacks from Karachi and Thatta. Investigations identified 37 suspects, most of them Pakistani nationals, including two Pakistan Army officers.
US-Pakistani dual national David Coleman Headley revealed in court that he had conducted reconnaissance in Mumbai on behalf of LeT and that his cover was facilitated by Tahawwur Rana, a Pakistani-Canadian businessman now facing extradition to India. Headley’s confession, detailing his meetings with ISI officials who coordinated LeT’s activities, further dismantled Pakistan’s façade of denial.
Despite overwhelming evidence, Pakistan’s actions were half-hearted and cosmetic. The so-called “mastermind” Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi was arrested but later released on bail. Hafiz Saeed continued to deliver public sermons in Lahore under police protection. For years, Pakistani courts stalled the trials, citing “lack of evidence” even when India and international agencies provided irrefutable material proof.
What makes 26/11 uniquely revealing is that it was not an isolated incident, but part of a systematic state policy. The documentation of terrorist attacks — from the 2008 Jaipur blasts to the 2019 Pulwama and 2025 Pahalgam attacks — exposes a consistent pattern: Terrorist groups like LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) operate freely from Pakistani soil. Their cadres receive funding, training, and ideological direction from Pakistan’s ISI. Each major attack — from Mumbai to Uri and Pulwama — has revealed Pakistani-origin operatives, weapons, and communication links.
In the 26/11 case, LeT’s command-and-control centre functioned almost like a military operations room. Pakistani handlers monitored live television coverage to adjust instructions. This level of sophistication — using encrypted VoIP systems, GPS mapping, and real-time tactical coordination — could not have occurred without state facilitation.
Over the decades, Pakistan’s military establishment has perfected a dual strategy: maintaining an international image of a counterterrorism partner while continuing to use jihadist proxies as instruments of foreign policy. The pattern spans decades: 2008 Jaipur blasts engineered by Indian Mujahideen under ISI patronage. 2008 Mumbai siege executed by LeT with direct Pakistani command.2016 Uri and Nagrota attacks, linked to JeM commanders backed by Rawalpindi.2019 Pulwama suicide bombing, claimed by JeM with clear Pakistani coordination. 2025 Pahalgam massacre, tied to LeT’s offshoot, the TRF, allegedly supported by Pakistan’s Special Services Group.
Each incident reinforces what India and much of the international community now recognise: Pakistan remains the global epicentre of terrorism, where groups are not merely tolerated but systematically cultivated as strategic assets.
Seventeen years on, the Mumbai terror attacks stand as a grim reminder of what state-sponsored terrorism looks like in its most lethal form. For India, it reshaped national security policy—leading to the creation of the National Investigation Agency (NIA), the strengthening of coastal surveillance, and enhanced intelligence coordination. For the world, 26/11 exposed a far darker truth: that terrorism can flourish under the umbrella of a state that denies, deflects, and deploys it as a geopolitical tool.
Remembering 26/11, therefore, is not merely about honouring the victims. It is about calling out the machinery of terror that continues to operate with impunity across the border.Until Pakistan dismantles its jihadist infrastructure and holds its military-intelligence establishment accountable, peace in South Asia, and indeed global security, will remain hostage to its state-backed terror machine. (IPA Service)
