The Union Cabinet’s recent approval of the “One Nation, One Election” proposal is a bold and ambitious move by the Modi government, aiming to synchronize elections across the Lok Sabha, state assemblies, urban bodies, and panchayats. This significant shift is rooted in recommendations from a panel chaired by former President Ram Nath Kovind, which reported widespread backing for the idea. However, as the government inches closer to tabling this initiative in Parliament, the question remains: is it feasible, and can India realistically implement such a sweeping change?
Historically, simultaneous elections were once the norm in India. From the country’s first general election in 1951/52 until 1967, the Lok Sabha and state assembly elections were held together. However, political instability in the late 1960s, marked by premature dissolutions of both state governments and the Lok Sabha, shattered this electoral harmony. Since then, India has experienced a staggered election cycle, with various states holding polls at different times, creating a system where elections are an almost constant feature. The push to revert to simultaneous elections is not without merit. Proponents argue that it would curb the financial burden on both the exchequer and political parties, while also reducing the strain on security forces deployed during elections. Voter fatigue, a by-product of incessant polling, could be alleviated, potentially increasing turnout and streamlining governance. By removing the constant specter of elections, governments could focus on long-term policy-making instead of short-term electoral gains.
However, the reality of implementing “One Nation, One Election” is far more complex. The legal, constitutional, and logistical challenges are formidable. At present, the Constitution allows for the premature dissolution of state governments or even the central government if they lose the majority in the house. This provision would be a major obstacle to aligning election cycles across the board. To bring back simultaneous elections, substantial constitutional amendments would be necessary. Key articles, such as those governing the duration and dissolution of legislatures, would need to be reworked. Additionally, the power to impose President’s Rule in states might require rethinking.
In practical terms, the Modi government must navigate an uphill battle in Parliament. Passing the required legislation will be no easy feat, particularly as it demands a two-thirds majority for constitutional amendments. While the BJP enjoys a simple majority in the Lok Sabha, it still lacks the numbers to achieve this in both Houses. In the Rajya Sabha, the party falls short by 52 votes and by 72 in the Lok Sabha, making opposition support essential for any hope of passage. Given the opposition’s current stance, this could prove to be a near-insurmountable challenge. Beyond parliamentary approval, at least half of India’s states would need to ratify these changes, a task that could hinge on the political landscape at the time. With the BJP and its allies currently in control of 19 states, there is some room for maneuvering here, but it remains far from guaranteed.
Beyond legislative and political considerations, there are broader concerns about the implications for democratic norms. Curtailing or extending the terms of state governments to align election cycles raises serious ethical questions. Such actions could undermine federalism and lead to legal challenges, with critics arguing that it would centralize power at the expense of state autonomy. Furthermore, given India’s sheer size and diversity, implementing a one-size-fits-all solution may prove overly simplistic. Different states and regions face distinct political and social challenges, and synchronizing elections could exacerbate existing tensions rather than resolve them.
