Ten-year pact signals strategic priorities in Indo-Pacific power play
By TN Ashok
In a striking display of geopolitical pragmatism, India and the United States finalized a sweeping 10-year defence framework agreement this week, even as a bitter tariff dispute threatens to derail a $530 billion trade deal between the world’s largest democracies.
The defence pact, signed after talks between U.S. War Secretary Pete Hegseth and Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh on the sidelines of an Asian security conference, underscores how security imperatives in the Indo-Pacific are overriding economic frictions that have brought bilateral trade negotiations to a standstill.
The timing is remarkable. President Donald Trump has imposed punishing 50% tariffs on Indian imports, including a 25% penalty specifically targeting New Delhi’s purchases of Russian oil and military equipment. The administration has also slapped 100% tariffs on non-generic pharmaceuticals from India, a sector where Indian companies supply nearly 40% of generic drugs to the American market. These measures have thrown cold water on trade talks that were supposed to yield a comprehensive agreement by November.
Yet despite this economic brinkmanship—or perhaps because of it—both nations have chosen to deepen their defence partnership, signalling that strategic alignment against China’s assertiveness takes precedence over commercial disputes.
The defence framework agreement, formally titled the “India-U.S. Defence Cooperation Framework for 2025-2035,” establishes an institutional architecture for military collaboration that officials on both sides describe as unprecedented in scope.
According to details shared by defence officials, the pact encompasses five key pillars: joint military exercises and training programs; intelligence sharing and maritime domain awareness; defence technology co-production and co-development; military logistics and maintenance cooperation; and strategic consultations on Indo-Pacific security.
The agreement expands on existing foundational pacts between the two countries, including the 2016 Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), which allows military forces to use each other’s bases for supplies and repairs, and the 2018 Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), enabling secure communications between their militaries.
“This is a signal of our growing strategic convergence and will herald a new decade of partnership,” Singh said in a statement following the signing. “Defence will remain as a major pillar of our bilateral relations. Our partnership is critical for ensuring a free, open and rules-based Indo-Pacific region.”
Hegseth described the framework as enhancing “coordination, information sharing and tech cooperation” while advancing “regional stability and deterrence.” Pentagon officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the agreement would facilitate the transfer of cutting-edge military technologies to India, including propulsion systems, aircraft engines, and potentially semiconductor manufacturing capabilities for defence applications.
The framework also establishes a joint India-U.S. Defence Technology Council to fast-track co-development projects and streamline export licensing procedures. This could accelerate India’s acquisition of American military platforms, including the F-35 stealth fighter jets that Trump dangled before Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his February visit to Washington.
The defence accord’s timing appears designed to provide diplomatic ballast as trade relations deteriorate. India accounts for approximately $82 billion in bilateral trade with the United States annually, with roughly 50% of that figure taking a hit fro tariffs— Trump’s tariff barrage directly threatens this economic lifeline.
The 50% tariff on Indian goods, combined with specific penalties on Russian oil purchases, has particularly stung New Delhi. India has become one of the largest buyers of discounted Russian crude since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, helping to stabilize domestic fuel prices and manage inflation. The Trump administration views this relationship as undermining Western sanctions and enriching Russia’s war machine.
Similarly, the 100% tariff on non-generic drugs strikes at a crown jewel of India’s economy. Indian pharmaceutical companies have invested billions in manufacturing facilities and research, making the country the world’s pharmacy hub. The tariff effectively prices many Indian drugmakers out of the American market.
Trade negotiations, which had aimed to produce a comprehensive agreement by November covering everything from market access to intellectual property protections, have essentially frozen. Indian officials privately express frustration that Trump appears more interested in punitive measures than constructive engagement, while American negotiators complain that India refuses to reduce its dependence on Russian energy and arms.
Yet the defence agreement suggests both sides recognize that allowing trade disputes to poison the entire relationship would be strategically shortsighted. With China’s military and economic footprint expanding across Asia, neither Washington nor New Delhi can afford to let tariff squabbles torpedo security cooperation.
The defence pact sends an unmistakable message to Beijing, which has watched nervously as India and the United States have steadily expanded military ties over the past decade. The 10-year timeframe provides predictability and depth to a partnership that China had hoped might be constrained by the Trump administration’s transactional approach to foreign policy.
For China, the agreement represents a worst-case scenario: despite American tariffs and India’s continued purchases of Russian oil, the U.S.-India axis continues to strengthen. The pact implicitly targets China’s assertiveness along the disputed Himalayan border with India, where deadly clashes in 2020 killed dozens of soldiers, and in the South China Sea, where Beijing’s territorial claims clash with freedom of navigation principles championed by Washington and New Delhi.
Military analysts note that enhanced intelligence sharing and maritime domain awareness—key components of the new framework—will improve India’s ability to monitor Chinese naval movements in the Indian Ocean, where Beijing has established port facilities in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar. Joint exercises will also increase interoperability between American and Indian forces, making coordinated responses to potential crises more feasible.
“China views this as part of a containment strategy,” said Tanvi Madan, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. “Even with the trade tensions, Beijing sees Washington and New Delhi locking in a long-term strategic partnership aimed at constraining Chinese influence across the Indo-Pacific.”
Complicating Beijing’s calculus is its own fraught relationship with the Trump administration. While Trump has courted Chinese cooperation on rare earth minerals—critical for everything from smartphones to missile systems—his tariff policies and confrontational rhetoric have produced anything but goodwill. The defence pact with India suggests the United States is hedging its bets, building alternative partnerships even as it negotiates with China.
The agreement also creates strategic headaches for Pakistan, which has long relied on its alliance with China and periodic partnerships with the United States to balance India’s conventional military superiority. The 10-year framework essentially formalizes America’s tilt toward New Delhi, reducing Pakistan’s leverage in Washington.
Pakistan has watched with growing concern as U.S.-India defence cooperation has deepened, fearing that American military technology and intelligence support will further tip the regional balance. Islamabad has responded by strengthening ties with Beijing, which has invested billions in Pakistan through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and provided advanced military equipment, including JF-17 fighter jets and submarines.
Yet Pakistan also finds itself courted by the Trump administration for its rare earth mineral deposits, particularly in Baluchistan province. American officials have held quiet discussions with Pakistani counterparts about developing these resources as part of an effort to reduce dependence on Chinese supplies. This creates an awkward dynamic: Washington simultaneously strengthens Pakistan’s primary adversary while seeking Pakistan’s cooperation on critical minerals.
“Pakistan feels squeezed,” said Ayesha Siddiqa, a defence analyst based in Islamabad. “The U.S.-India defence framework limits Pakistan’s options while Trump’s rare earth diplomacy provides only modest compensation. Islamabad’s response will be to lean even harder on China.”
The defence agreement also reflects India’s gradual shift away from its traditional defence supplier. While Russia continues to provide military equipment to India, Moscow’s share of Indian defence imports has declined from over 70% a decade ago to approximately 45% today. India has diversified its procurement, purchasing from France, Israel, and increasingly the United States.
This diversification stems partly from concerns about Russian equipment reliability and maintenance issues, but also from India’s desire to access cutting-edge Western technology. The new framework accelerates this trend by institutionalizing defence technology transfers and co-production arrangements that Russia cannot match.
American officials have long pressured India to reduce dependence on Russian arms, arguing that it creates vulnerabilities and complications for interoperability with U.S. systems. The framework provides incentives for India to continue moving in this direction, even if New Delhi refuses to completely sever defence ties with Moscow.
The India-U.S. defence framework reveals an important reality about contemporary geopolitics: strategic imperatives often override economic disputes. Despite trade tensions that would normally poison bilateral relations, both countries have concluded that their shared interest in balancing China necessitates deepening security cooperation.
Whether this approach proves sustainable remains uncertain. If trade talks remain stalled and tariffs continue inflicting economic pain, domestic political pressures in both countries could eventually force a reckoning. Indian businesses hurt by American tariffs may demand that Modi adopt a harder line, while American pharmaceutical companies facing higher drug prices could pressure the Trump administration to negotiate.
For now, however, the message from Kuala Lumpur is clear: when it comes to Indo-Pacific security, India and the United States are willing to look past their economic differences to build a partnership designed to last a decade—and to make both China and Pakistan decidedly uncomfortable in the process. (IPA Service)
