India’s pivot from Russia to the West in the 1990s was sparked by a historic betrayal — here’s why ditching America for Moscow now could risk repeating past mistakes.
If hell is run by an Indian, there is a special place in it for Andrei Kozyrev, the Russian foreign minister from 1990 to 1996. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Kozyrev became the new foreign minister of Russia, and supported close ties with the West, ignoring Russia’s ties with its old allies. The minister may well have been a CIA mole because he single handedly wrecked the decades old Indo-Soviet partnership.
As per the Kozyrev Doctrine, the new Russia would no longer give special importance to India but instead would treat India and Pakistan as equals. This Russian foreign policy seemed like it was drafted in Washington DC.
The new Russian doctrine took things a bit too far. When Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao sent his emissary Mani Dixit to the Kremlin to urgently get spare parts for India’s armed forces (which depended on Russia for more than 70 percent of their requirements), Kozyrev refused to meet him – a major diplomatic snub which would eventually cost Russia tens of billions of dollars in lost defence sales but more importantly the trust of its only major friend. Instead, Kozyrev sent a junior diplomat. Worse, nobody in Moscow gave any assurances or guarantees about the spares.
Had India gone to war with Pakistan or China at that point, its armed forces would have run out of spares in a week. This was not only a violation of international trade contracts but a major betrayal that India’s leadership took very seriously. We are not talking about cement, crude oil or fertilisers which could be acquired on the spot markets, but strategic items like gas turbines for Indian warships, engines for the MiG-29 fleet and drive shafts for the T-72 tanks. It was crunch time for the Indian military.
Kozyrev had downgraded India – a time tested friend and the largest buyer of Russian weapons. And Pakistan, the country that was responsible for the deaths of 15,000 Soviet lives during the Afghanistan War, was upgraded by equating it with India. This move had the fingerprints of American intelligence all over it.
Deepa Ollapally of George Washington University writes in the paper titled Indo-Russian Strategic Relations: New Choices and Constraints: “Kozyrev relegated India to a secondary role. During this initial phase, which was to last until 1996, India was forced to take the initiative to try to build new bridges to the Duma and utilise earlier Soviet lobbies. India was able to exploit lobbies against Kozyrev’s tilt which had formed in the Russian Federation presidential apparatus. It was aided by such figures such as Vladimir Lukin who called for greater attention to be paid to old allies.”
“However, Narasimha Rao had no choice but to diversify India’s security links as its most crucial erstwhile ally continued to labour in confusion and anxiety over its economic and political status, with no clear signal regarding its foreign policy preferences.”
The Russian foreign minister’s policies — whether by design or incompetence — effectively handed the United States a strategic victory by alienating a key Russian ally.
Kozyrev currently lives in Miami where he has acquired lots of wealth and a nice tan. He constantly criticises Putin to the delight of his American backers (or perhaps handlers). In fact, in April 2025, Russia’s Ministry of Justice designated Kozyrev as a “foreign agent.” So, the minister was an American mole all along. Those CIA agents deserve Congressional medals.
India’s Pivot to the West
Faced with Russia’s unreliability, Narasimha Rao had no choice but to diversify India’s security partnerships. The early 1990s were a period of economic and political turmoil for Russia, leaving India with little clarity on Moscow’s foreign policy priorities. As a result, India began forging stronger ties with the United States, a move that has since reshaped its defence and strategic decision making. Since then India has spent billions on American military hardware, including:
12 C-130J Super Hercules aircraft ($2 billion)
Eight P-8I long-range maritime patrol aircraft ($2.1 billion)
10 C-17 Globemaster-III strategic airlift aircraft ($4.1 billion)
145 M777 ultralight howitzers ($438 million)
22 Apache attack helicopters and 15 Chinook heavy-lift helicopters ($2.5 billion)
These acquisitions not only bolstered India’s military capabilities but also signalled a strategic realignment toward the West, driven by necessity rather than preference. The United States, eager to counterbalance China’s growing influence, saw India as a critical partner in the Indo-Pacific region.
Russia’s Internal Divide: Old Guard vs Western Aspirants
Russia’s foreign policy is shaped by two distinct factions within the Kremlin. The old guard, exemplified by nationalists like President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, values Russia’s historical relationships, including its partnership with India. Under Putin, Moscow has sought to rebuild ties with New Delhi, offering affordable oil and minerals and emphasising that, unlike the West, Moscow will never impose sanctions on India. This reliability has been a boon for India, particularly amid global energy crises and geopolitical tensions.
However, a second faction, the “Look West” group, continues to advocate for integration with the West, clinging to the unrealistic vision of a unified European identity. This group, often younger and less attuned to Russia’s geopolitical realities, fails to recognise the West’s historical disdain for Russia, viewing Slavs — particularly Russians — as Untermensch or inferior.
This delusion, rooted in a desire for Western acceptance, mirrors the policies of Kozyrev and former Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who prioritised Western integration at the expense of Russia’s traditional allies. The allure of Western culture — symbolised by superficial markers like Starbucks and KFC — blinds some Russians to the long-term consequences of their aspirations.
In this backdrop diplomat Roman Babushkin’s recent statement that Russia is a more reliable partner than America should be treated with caution rather than exuberance. A diplomat’s job is to upsell his country abroad, and Babushkin is doing it well. But his statements should not be taken at face value.
While Putin’s leadership currently ensures Russia’s commitment to India, this may not hold true for future generations of Russian leaders. In 2015, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov declared that Russia and Pakistan were negotiating for the delivery of an unspecified number of the powerful Su-35 jets to Pakistan. According to Ryabkov, increasing military cooperation between Moscow and Islamabad would not negatively impact Russia’s ties with India. The risk of another figure like Kozyrev or Ryabkov emerging underscores the fragility of India’s reliance on Moscow. As history has shown, Russia’s foreign policy can shift dramatically with changes in leadership, leaving allies like India stranded and vulnerable.
Path Forward: Strategic Multilateralism
India’s current foreign policy, also known as “Modi’s Multilateralism,” emphasises working with all major powers while maintaining strategic autonomy. This approach has served India well, allowing it to leverage relationships with both the United States and Russia without becoming overly dependent on either. However, recent geopolitical shifts, including Russia’s reliability as an energy supplier, might tempt India to tilt back toward Moscow. Such a move would be shortsighted.
Firstly, the United States is important to India as it offers access to advanced technology and military hardware critical for countering China’s growing assertiveness. While the US may one day become a strategic adversary, India’s current priority should be to absorb as much technological expertise and military capability as possible. The billions spent on American weapons systems have enhanced India’s defence capabilities, particularly in areas like maritime patrol and strategic airlift, which Russia cannot match.
Secondly, Russia’s economic and political instability, though less severe than in the 1990s, remains a concern. Its dependence on China for economic support and its isolation from the West due to sanctions limit its ability to serve as a consistent partner. In contrast, the United States, despite its own challenges, offers a more stable and technologically advanced partnership. At the same time, India must remain vigilant, ensuring that it does not become overly dependent on US goodwill, which could shift with changes in America’s priorities.
Conclusion
US President Donald Trump may rant and rave, but India’s foreign policy must be guided by pragmatism, not sentimentality. The Kozyrev Doctrine’s legacy is a stark reminder of Russia’s potential unreliability, while the United States’ strategic importance cannot be ignored in the current global order. By balancing its relationships with both powers, India can safeguard its interests and maintain its strategic autonomy in an increasingly volatile world.
India doesn’t owe Russia loyalty for past favours — especially when Moscow once left it vulnerable. The future belongs to those who remember the past and refuse to repeat it. (courtesy:www.businessworld.in)
(The Writer is a New Zealand based defence analyst. His work has been published by leading think tanks, and quoted extensively in books on diplomacy, counter terrorism, warfare and economic development)
