Nishta Kaushiki

If Pakistan gets more opportunities to play the Taliban card, it will project itself as a victim and a representative of Islam and carry forward the agenda of Jihad

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), with its Karakoram (land) and Gwadar (sea) projects, has a military significance to serve as important choke-points vis-à-vis India. However, as the Taliban has requested China to include Afghanistan in its project, the tip of the Wakhan corridor located at the China-Tajikistan-Afghanistan tri-junction is all set to become the epicentre of terror and expansionism of China.

In the emerging scenario, the recently concluded Delhi Dialogue brought India along with the five Central Asian Republics (CAR), Iran and Russia on the same level playing field concerning the threats faced from the Taliban and Pakistan’s rapid Talibanisation. These countries are in the geographical vicinity of Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are now set to become the terror-exporting hotspots of South and Central Asia. Russian and Iranian ‘moment of victory’ has passed, and the realities now seem to be setting in. The same is the case with CAR, except for Tajikistan. Immediately after the Delhi Dialogue, the Troika Plus meeting was held in Islamabad, bringing the US and Russia together on the negotiating table with the Taliban, China, and Pakistan.

On the other hand, three months have passed since the Taliban’s takeover, and Pakistan has been unable to ‘get’ international recognition for it.  However, an added dimension is Pakistan threatening the international community, particularly Europe,with consequences if the terrorists are not duly recognized.

Pakistan and the Taliban have already shed their camouflage and openly declared their intentions towards an Islamic emirate. The recent face-off between its army and Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan, the right to contest elections given to Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), and a truce with Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) speak volumes of it. Parallel developments such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan being wary of the Taliban and tightening security at their borders, Turkey and Iran agreeing to cooperate to restrict the refugees from Afghanistan and the refugee debate in Eastern Europe hint at the future political-institutional challenges stemming out of Taliban-Pakistan partnership.

The question is why the Taliban and Pakistan are desperate for CPEC to be extended to Afghanistan? Why, despite setting the narratives of a US decline, the region’s countries are not feeling secure? The possible Chinese control of the Bagram airbase and the exploitation of the natural resources in Afghanistan has already been emphasized by many. However, the Pak-Taliban game-plan is perhaps much more than what the world community, including China,can comprehend.

The world community is hesitant to accommodate fundamentalism which is why despite Russia and China reacting ‘favourably’ to the Taliban, they have not yet rushed to recognize the fundamentalist regime.Previously, the Ayanak and Jiangsu-Hairatan railway Projects failed to yield the expected results. Pakistan and the Taliban henceforth want to bank on the countries of Europe so that they can assert themselves aggressively. The more the stakeholders in Afghanistan, the better it is for them as the situation would get entangled even further, ultimately benefiting the two. The extension of OBOR will generate the following security implications:

First, it will expose the future vulnerabilities of international trade to ensure a smooth passage. The Taliban and Pakistan would have to be strategically, financially, and diplomatically appeased, irrespective of the countries’ interests. If Pakistan gets more opportunities to play the ‘Taliban card’, it will project itself as a ‘victim’ and a representative of Islam and would make no hesitations to carry forward the agenda of Jihad by whatever means possible. There are many chances that the terror spillover effect would be seen in China’s Xinjiang region, the CAR, Iran, and Europe. Imran Khan’s UN speech is an important precedent that signals that terror groups being used as foreign policy instruments. Likewise, the nation-states of Eastern Europe and Central Asia will soon find themselves entrapped in a Stockholm Syndrome wherein supplying aid to Pakistan for ‘controlling’ the fundamentalist elements would increasingly be seen as a viable option by many. This would be similar to the strategic trap in which the US too fell. It has to be recalled that from 2013 to 2018, Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally was given $34,183 million out of which $257 million was for Migration and Refugee Assistance and $4,075 million was for Foreign Military Financing. Probably officials at Rawalpindi can better explain where the aid was utilized. Such a vicious circle does not yield results, and by the time Europe realizes the same, it again might be too late.

Secondly, it is beyond doubt that the Afghans will not be getting any employment opportunities in the Corridor projects, and the land available to them for farming and other small economic activities would be taken away from them as the case has been in Pakistan. In such a scenario, the macro ethnic communities of Afghanistan such as Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Baluchs will continue to suffer and create refugee problems for the region, the implications of which would be felt by Europe too. The projects would only reinforce the existing illegal supply routes of drugs, illegal child and women trafficking apart from exporting terror.

The export of refugees and migrants through the Eastern Mediterranean and Balkans routes to bring about deliberate demographic changes and creating rifts among the EU member-states on the issue of human rights cannot be ruled out. The oppressive policies adopted for the corridor could also perhaps be utilized by the fundamentalists to interfere in the domestic issues of the European countries, especially France. The refugee issue being used as a geopolitical tool has been recently highlighted during the Poland-Belarus face off.

Thirdly, to ensure the safety and the security of the Afghan corridor, the armies of Pakistan and China would further consolidate their stronghold not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan. For instance, Islamabad saw the formation of the National Action Plan (a 20-point action crackdown against terrorists),which gave the army a wide range of powers. With ‘business as usual’ and the territory of Afghanistan used as a transit passage, the route will be a bargaining chip in the hands of the fundamentalists.

Fourthly, through their preferential access to Afghanistan’s Western and Northern borders, Pakistan and China would pose a considerable tactical threat to India and Tajikistan and definitely would adversely affect the Russian influence in the region. What remains to be seen is whether Russia would be further willing to play a ‘junior partner’ to China and elevate Pakistan on the same level playing field as it is in terms of strategic utility?

Finally, the Taliban has mastered a communication strategy with crisp English and mannerism to deceive the countries in the region and beyond with its propaganda warfare. From giving statements of its ‘change of heart’ to strategizing its ‘foreign policy agenda’, the narratives that are being set to portray the Taliban as the rightful heir of Afghanistan set a precedent that various terrorist and extremist groups would emulate throughout the world. If China goes ahead with its Afghan corridor given the above factors, it would be seen as another expansionist move of the Dragon. Thus, it becomes essential that Asia, Europe, and the U.S. come together to convey their displeasure by not letting the Afghan corridor be used for trade even if OBOR is extended to it.

(The writer is an Assistant Professor at Central University of Punjab, Bathinda. The views expressed are personal.)