Vivek Gumatse
Capitalising on the US decision to withdraw from Afghanistan, the Taliban has accelerated its violent sweep across the country, grabbing large swathes of territory to establish itself as the sole stakeholder to govern Afghanistan. In this rapidly changing geopolitical scenario of Taliban ascendancy, the clamour for India to initiate talks with the Taliban is growing louder.
So, how does India position itself to address its security concerns vis-a-vis terrorism spilling over from Afghanistan into Kashmir and protect its investment there? Should India shed its past inhibitions, compromise on its principles and invoke pragmatism to initiate talks with the Taliban? And what are the chances of the talks succeeding?
To begin with, India has had a strained relationship with the Taliban. The last time it was in power (1996-2001), there was a sharp increase in Afghan Jihadi elements infiltrating into Kashmir. And in 1999, it was in the forefront of providing sanctuary and safe passage to the hijackers of IC-814 at Kandahar who had successfully negotiated the release of Masood Azhar, the leader of Jaish-e-Mohammed; it was a humiliating experience that India must not forget or forgive.
Additionally, Kashmiri terrorist groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Hizbul Mujahideen have strong continuing bonds with some factions of the Taliban, who share their anti-India hostility. The Haqqani group, which is one of the well-trained Taliban factions, has targeted several Indian consulates in the past and was responsible for the deadly Kabul bombing in 2008 that killed over 50 people. Given its committed anti-India sentiments and inseparable ties with Kashmir-centric terror groups, it is unlikely that the Taliban will change its policy towards India. Even if some of its factions may negotiate with India, its disjointed hierarchy with its disparate groups makes it almost impossible for a top-down diktat to work.
And then there is the Pakistan factor. The Taliban is Pakistan’s Frankenstein, created and sustained by the ISI. Pakistan maintains a stranglehold over the Taliban, acting as its puppeteer. Reading between the lines, one can also speculate that the Doha Accord, though primarily between the Taliban and the US to prevent a recurrence of terrorism, is an outcome of crafty Pakistan Machiavellianism. The Taliban’s acquiescence at the insistence of Pakistan underlines a bigger Pakistani game plan: Pakistan aims to shift its anti-India terrorist activity into a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan to circumvent the FATF sanctions. Pakistan has too much at stake to allow even an iota of rapprochement between India and the Taliban.
To claim that India’s outreach will embolden the Taliban to strike an independent path bereft of Pakistan’s influence (as some commentators assert) is nothing more than wishful thinking. The discordant voices emanating from the Taliban and the continuous flip-flops do not inspire confidence for negotiations. Last year, when Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid said they would “capture Kashmir from infidels” after gaining control of Kabul, Suhail Shaheen, the spokesperson for the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the political wing of Taliban, stepped in to clarify: “The statement published in the media about the Taliban joining Jihad in Kashmir is wrong…. The policy of the Islamic Emirate is clear that it does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.”
This conciliatory tone may have been a ploy to temper India’s military support for the Afghan Government till the Taliban attained its objective. Today, Suhail Shaheen is singing a different tune. Recently, he remarked: “India was siding with the Government installed by foreigners. They are not with us. If they stick to their policy of supporting a Government imposed on Afghans, then maybe they should be worried. That is a wrong policy which will not serve them.” (Anchal Vohra: ‘India Is Scrambling to Get on the Taliban’s Good Side’; Foreign Policy; July 13, 2021.)
Realistically speaking, talks with the Taliban are a futile venture and unlikely to yield any results. But there can be no harm in India pursuing this line of thought as a lateral avenue. Against this evil triumvirate of Pakistan, the Taliban and Kashmiri terrorist groups, the civilian-led Ashraf Ghani Government, however weak, is still India’s best bet.
A quick and complete takeover by the Taliban may not be a given. On July 21 and 22, alarmed by the Taliban’s rapid gains, the US launched multiple airstrikes in and around Kandahar to stall the Taliban’s advance. And there are indications that there may be more airstrikes.
So, short of putting boots on the ground, India must continue to support the Afghan National Security Forces as it has done so far by training army personnel and supplying essential military equipment. In addition, it should initiate a broader diplomatic initiative under the aegis of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the United Nations to stall a violent takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban.
While we can continue to explore these options, in the ultimate analysis we alone are responsible for our security and cannot be dependent on external permutations and combinations. In short, a robust and advanced military preparedness along the entire perimeter of our nation is the only iron-clad permanent security guarantee.
(The author, a US-based academic and political commentator, frequently writes on current affairs in India. The views expressed are personal.)
